Abstract-Security has traditionally been dealt with at layers higher than the physical layer but in the wake of 5G, security at all layers is necessary to deal with the variations in complexity of connected devices. Low power devices may use physical layer security as a solution, while other devices may use physical layer security to complement security at higher layers. One key metric for physical layer security is the secrecy capacity. This is the maximum rate that a system can transmit with perfect secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
To meet ever-increasing demands for higher capacity and throughput, the launch of 5G is approaching, with aims to be commercially available by 2020 [1] . These requirements, partly fuelled by an explosion in the number of connected devices, cannot be satisfied by current communications technologies and Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems and Massive MIMO (a MIMO system with 100+ antennas at the base station) [2] are among the technologies hoped to be used for 5G [3] . In light of 5G and the reduced complexity requirements of emerging trends in technology such as low power connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices, security at physical layer has had a renewal of interest. Typically security is dealt with at higher layers than physical, but due to the stacked layers in communication devices, physical layer security may also work in tandem with higher layers. Cryptographic techniques, and other security methods, rely on generated randomness, which can be computationally heavy. Physical layer security exploits the randomness already available in the channel, typically the wireless medium, and thus is promising for low complexity devices.
Physical layer security has an information theoretic foundation and is theoretically unbreakable. Quantifying security in terms of information leakage was first considered by Shannon in [4] and the traditional model stems from Wyner's work in 1975 [5] , the 'Wiretap Channel' seen in Figure 1 . The typical set up considered involves two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, transmitting across a channel with an eavesdropper, Eve. The information theoretic constructs give an idea of how much useful information the eavesdropper is able to obtain, known as the information leakage. These secrecy measures, which depend on block length and the channel quality are independent of computational power and thus applicable to any technologies. The model for communication in a MIMO system is different to that of a traditional single antenna wireless communication and thus existing security methods and physical layer methods must be adapted and explored for these systems. With multiple antennas, the users have channel matrices rather than just channel coefficients, and with these matrices come an increased number of degrees of freedom in the system design. This paper focuses on the maximum rate at which Alice may transmit to Bob reliably without Eve gaining any useful information, known as the secrecy capacity. The secrecy capacity of a channel is the theoretical maximum rate for secure, reliable communications in the presence of an eavesdropper and is formally defined below. Currently, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO channel is known to be a nonconvex optimisation problem which is difficult to solve in general. This paper presents an optimisation scheme which is convex and can be used to give the secrecy capacity and the corresponding input covariance matrix.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II introduces the channel setup and the previous work on secrecy capacity for MIMO systems. Section III formulates the problem addressed and states the main theorem. The proof of this theorem is presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes and discusses the relevance of the result.
II. PREVIOUS WORK

A. Setup
Let n denote the number of antennas at the transmitter, n B denote the number of antennas at the legitimate receiver and n E the number of antennas at the eavesdropper.
The channel between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver shall be referred to as the main channel while the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper shall be referred to as the eavesdropper channel. Their channel matrices are described by the matrices H B , an n B × n matrix for the main channel and H E , an n E × n matrix for the eavesdropper channel. For convenience, we will define the following symmetric n × n matrices
The received vectors at Bob and Eve, denoted Y and Z respectively, are:
where N B and N E are the noise vectors for the two channels. The input signal is subject to a power constraint P such that the trace of the covariance matrix, Q is bounded above by P. That is,
For the Gaussian wiretap channel the noise vectors are assumed to be Gaussian with zero mean and identity covariance:
The noise is independent between channel realisations. Due to the assumption of statistical independence between the antenna elements, the channel matrices H B and H E are modelled to have IID entries.
B. Secrecy Capacity
For the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity, C s , was found in [6] , [7] and independently in [8] to be of the form:
such that Q 0, where P is the power constraint of the system and Q is the n × n covariance matrix of the input signal. The secrecy capacity is achieved for an input of symbols with a Gaussian distribution while using the full power available, P. The optimisation problem in Equation (3) is generally not easily solved for Q. The problem is nonconvex and the solution is only known for certain scenarios. For an overview of special cases which are known see [9] . The Multiple Input Single Output (MISO) system, where n B = 1 is fully understood with the optimal Q and C s being known in closed form determined in [6] . These results hold for any number of eavesdrop antennas. The only known case with multiple receive antennas, n B is the '2-2-1' case, with n = n B = 2 and n E = 1. The optimal Q and C s was established in [10] .
Although the general maximum is not known in closed form, there is a numerical method by [11] giving an algorithm to obtain the secrecy capacity, with an associated proof of convergence to the optimum based on a matrix power series expansion.
The main work in this paper reformulates the secrecy capacity into a convex problem so that existing convex optimisation tools may be used to solve for Q. The scheme is valid for n B ≥ n and n E = 1, which covers a family of MIMO systems which are not yet fully understood theoretically.
III. MAIN RESULT
We first define a new optimisation problem to solve Equation (3) . By [12, p73] the log det(X) is concave for positive semidefinite matrices X. Since Q is restricted to positive semidefinite matrices, the arguments are concave. However, in general, their difference is neither convex nor concave. Thus we define the following problem:
such that s = det(I n E + H E QH * E ) and Q 0.
Since det(M) is not a convex constraint for a general matrix M, this further limits the problem space to one eavesdrop antenna as this makes I n E + H E QH * E a scalar. By fixing s, this becomes a concave problem. The scheme presented in this paper varies the value of s and runs convex optimisation software CVX [13] for each s. Each individual optimisation gives an output of a corresponding optimal matrix Q. Define:
and f (Q) = log det(I n B + H B QH * B ) − log s(Q).
θ (s) = max
A plot of θ (s) can be seen in Figure 2 . Finding the secrecy capacity is now a case of finding the maximum of θ (s). This is facilitated by the following Theorem, which gives a concavity result for θ which is the main result of our paper.
Let Q i be a matrix achieving the maximum value in (7) corresponding to s i , that is f (Q i ) = θ (s i ), for i ∈ {1, 2}. By definition,
Without loss of generality, assume s 1 ≥ s 2 . Let s t be a convex combination of s 1 and s 2 :
Theorem 1: For n E = 1 and any n B ≥ n, then
if the matrices K B and K E from Equations (1) and (2) satisfy
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The main argument consists of multiple steps. These can be broken down into the following: 1) Consider the problem defined in Equation (7) for a convex combination of inputs. We find a lower bound by applying new results by Courtade et al. [14] . 2) Minimising the difference between the lower bound, found in Step 1, with the desired lower bound. 3) Rewrite the upper and lower bounds in terms of symmetric matrices, resulting in the conditions stated in Theorem 1.
A. Step 1
For the first step, we require the following lemma: 
where λ max (·) denotes the largest eigenvalue and · F is the Frobenius norm. For ease of notation, define
The linear combination Q t = tQ 1 + (1 − t)Q 2 satisfies the constraint s(Q t ) = s t since n E = 1 and
By Lemma 1, taking
Rewriting Equation (13) gives
By the definition of f (·), this can be written as
Since the Q i are optimal matrices, this is equal to
B.
Step 2
We aim to minimise the difference between the convex combination
in Equation (15) and the upper bound, θ (s t ). Thus we introduce a constant κ(s 1 , s 2 ) and show that: 
By construction, g(0) = g(1) = 0. To show that g(t) ≥ 0 in the interval t ∈ [0, 1] is equivalent to showing that g(t) is concave in this interval, therefore considering when g (t) ≤ 0. The second derivative of g is:
Since s 2 ≤ s 1 , g(t) is concave for the value of κ(s 1 , s 2 ) in Equation (17) C.
Step 3 Combining Lemma 2 with Equation (10) means that Theorem 1 will follow from Equation (15) if
where as before
and
Writing Q := Q 1 − Q 2 for simplicity, the Frobenius norm on the left of Equation (19) can be rewritten as
where symmetric matrix
Retrieving the value of Q from R requires that H * B H B is invertible which requires n B ≥ n.
Similarly, considering the numerator of the right hand side of (19) gives:
where
Here Equation (24) follows by Cauchy-Schwarz, for any matrix C,
and Equation (25) follows by the submultiplicative property of the Frobenius norm [15, 5, 6] . Therefore the inequality in Equation (19) is satisfied when
Since each of λ 2 max (·), T 2 F and s 2 1 is positive, this follows by rewriting Equation (9) in the form
and the proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the expression for the secrecy capacity is known for the Gaussian wiretap channel, it is not generally known how to solve the optimisation problem for the covariance matrix, Q. The method presented in this paper gives an efficient way to search for the secrecy capacity of a MIMO system and a corresponding covariance matrix for the transmission. The use of existing convex optimisation schemes makes the problem presented in Equation (3) manageable. We show that it is possible to search numerically for the maximum using linear combinations of variables.
The transmission scheme corresponding to this covariance matrix will be information theoretically secure since the user is guaranteed to be transmitting at or below the secrecy capacity.
This scheme is specific to the case with n E = 1 and n B ≥ n. This is due to the requirements which arise in the derivation of the proof. These requirements do however cover a family of MIMO systems which are not fully understood at the time of writing.
